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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to determine whether there is a universally applicable process 
of reconciliation. In order to do so, it examines various transitional justice 
methods employed by societies recovering from extensive human rights 
violations. In particular it focuses on: recollective repression in the form of denial, 
rationalism and relativism, criminal prosecution for crimes against humanity, 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, lustration of members of the previous 
regime from positions of authority, apology and compensation. It finds that 
although certain reconciliation processes may be relatively more effective in 
fostering social harmony, the application of a generic form of justice would be 
ineffective and socially destructive . Rather, it determines that enduring national 
stability and growth can only be achieved by employing a process which considers 
the unique characteristics of the conflict. 
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COME TOGETHER OR JUST LET IT BE? 
THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO RECONCILIATION 
 
In the wake of horrific human rights violations perpetrated either by state authorities or external agents, 
societies are forced to confront the dilemma of “how shall we live with evil?”i Each individual process 
of reconciliation seeks not only to rebuild shattered economic institutions and unite a people behind a 
legitimate, democratic government but also to determine a just compromise between ‘keep[ing] the 
past alive without becoming its prisoner [and]…forget[ting] without risking its repetition in the 
future.’ii In an attempt to achieve this delicate equilibrium, recovering societies have employed a 
number of diverse methods of reconciliation; including criminal prosecutions for crimes against 
humanity, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, lustration of members of the previous regime from 
positions of public office, apology and compensation. Despite the benefits derived from each form of 
transitional justice, it is clear that there is no pre-eminent or universally applicable process of 
reconciliation. Rather, national renewal is most expediently achieved with regard to the unique 
characteristics of the discord. Only by the application of a specialised reconciliation strategy may a 
society emerge from the shadows of fear and repression and begin the process of ‘strengthening… 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’iii 
 
Despite international recognition of certain ethical principles, local idiosyncrasies prevent the universal 
application of a single method of transition justice. Instead, an effective process of reconciliation can 
only be determined by examining the character of the previous regime or conflict, the nation’s prior 
history of democracy, colonialism or ethnic conflict, customary notions of justice, the duration and 
extent of the violations, the percentage of the population who perpetrated or were complicit in state 
sanctioned atrocities and the stability of the current peace. The application of a generic form of justice, 
without regard for such fundamental sources of disparity between emerging nations, will only serve to 
prolong and exacerbate the ‘birthing pangs’ of the newly liberalised state.  
 
The disclosure of past atrocities is a vital element in the process of national renewal. However, many 
emerging countries employ social amnesia as a method of suppressing shameful episodes of the past. 
Thus denial, rationalisation and relativism are utilised in order to manipulate perceptions of history and 
‘discredit, default, denigrate or even blot out portions of it.’iv Such mechanisms of recollective 
repression may be seen in the marginalisation of the Dreyfus affair and collaborative Vichy regime 
within contemporary French history and the social amnesia surrounding American military action in 
Wounded Knee and My Laiv. This strategy of denial and reconstitution of historical myths, although 
universally favoured by perpetrators of atrocities, is fundamentally opposed to national reconciliation 
as victims of horrific human rights abuses are denied ‘recognition [of their suffering], indignation and 
compassion, [instead] there is…only silence.’ Such repression of public discussion not only serves to 
condone crimes against humanity by failing to expose those responsible, but may also engender private 
acts of revenge by victims deprived of legal means of justice. Whilst employed in order to prevent 
confrontation with past atrocities, social amnesia and denial merely impede the process of 
reconciliation and thus ‘[m]emory is the ultimate form of justice’.vi 
 
Prior to World War Two, international law was dominated by the concept of national sovereignty, 
which prevented external intervention and punishment for crimes that contravened global moral 
standards.vii This precedent was, however, overturned by the decision of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, which allowed individuals to be held criminally accountable for breaching 
international law. Although criticized by some as exacting ‘victors justice’ on a defeated enemyviii, the 
Military Tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo, Manila and numerous others, served as primary examples of 
trials which utilised the due process of law, in the most part, in order to ‘individualize the guilt’ of 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 
 
As a result of these trials, criminal sanctions against individual perpetrators of atrocities have become 
an accepted means of reconciliation through legitimising the new leadership, providing a means of 
specific and general deterrence and erasing any perception of a ‘culture of impunity’ .ix Based on the 
principle, articulated by Holocaust scholar Hannah Arendt, that we ‘are unable to forgive what [we] 
cannot punish’ x, the provision of legal redress to victims diminishes the perceived need to seek 
individual vengeance and thus brings some form of closure to victims of atrocities.xi  The punishment 
of individuals for specific crimes also serves to rehabilitate an emerging nation as the indictment of 
individuals prevents the consignment of collective guilt to a people. Individualising guilt has however 
been criticised as a superficial means of reconciliation as, by creating ‘scapegoats’, it allows members 
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of a complicit society to ignore their own guiltxii, thus preventing remedial institutional reforms and 
moral acceptancexiii. 
 
Despite the social benefits of a regulated means of punishment, certain fundamental flaws remain in the 
utilization of criminal sanctions as a form of reconciliation. Adherence to the rule of law by the new 
administration is vital in order to maintain social stability and manifestly separate itself from the 
methods of the old regime.xiv However, by punishing individuals for committing acts that, though 
abhorrent to international ethics, were legal in the previous regime, the current leadership is in breach 
of due process through the creation of ex post factoxv laws. Such retrospective justice serves to 
undermine the entire judicial process and may, as in the case of Rwanda, be perceived not as ending the 
cycle of vengeance but as a means of state revengexvi. 
 
A further disadvantage of criminal sanctions for violations of human rights is the necessary relegation 
of trials to symbolic gestures of moral condemnation as, due to time and financial constraints, only a 
small proportion of guilty parties will prosecuted. This narrow scope of possible criminal sanctions 
may result in the indicted parties being perceived as scapegoats whilst implying a grant of an amnesty 
to those not prosecuted.xvii Thus, ‘in the final analysis, punishment is one instrument, but not the sole or 
even the most important one, for forming the collective moral conscience’xviii. 
 
Despite the moral necessity of prosecuting human rights offenders, such retributive justice may be 
fatally compromised in situations when the past regime still maintains considerable force within the 
nation. Thus historically, successful prosecutions of past violators have only occurred where military 
rulers experienced demoralising external defeats.xix Where agents of repression are still active, such as 
Chile, a conciliatory policy of ‘pacification’ may be required, in which prosecutions of senior officials 
and military personnel are withheld in order to ensure the ongoing process of democratisation. 
Although condemned by many scholars as ‘lawful amnesia’ xx that undermines the legitimate and 
democratic nature of the new leadership, the granting of amnesty to human rights violators may 
ultimately assist reconciliation by ‘consolidat[ing] the peace of a country where human rights are 
guaranteed [rather than] seek[ing] retrospective justice that could compromise that peace.’xxi 
 
Perceived as a compromissory position between potentially destabilising prosecutions and social 
amnesia, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions provide an authoritative investigation into recent 
violations of human rights. Operating as an impartial body of enquiry, such commissions are only 
effective when implemented immediately after a change in the political situation and must not exceed a 
limited and specified period of operationxxii due to ‘society’s need to put the past behind it after a 
reasonable period of truth and justice’xxiii Rather than applying a blanket form of amnesty, which would 
imply the condoning of human rights abuses by the previous regime and the continuation of a culture of 
impunityxxiv, immunity from prosecution is only granted to individual perpetrators in exchange for full 
disclosure of their violations. Thus the incentive of amnesty serves to expose and document atrocities 
which would otherwise be deniedxxv, fulfilling the social requirement of truth, even if at the expense of 
accountability. Yet, despite the benefits derived from granting immunity from criminal sanctions, the 
practice of state-sanctioned exoneration has been criticised as usurping the victim’s ‘exclusive right’ to 
forgive his oppressorsxxvi, thus limiting closure and promoting private revenge. 
 
Regarded as a restorative, rather than retributive form of justicexxvii, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions also offer victims a unique means of receiving public acknowledgement of their 
suffering.xxviii By providing a sympathetic platform for survivors to relate their experiences, such 
commissions serve to overcome official and community denial of atrocities, encourage public 
discussion and condemnation of crimes against humanity and individualise incidents within a greater 
context of political violence.xxix Despite an absence of criminal sanctions, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions still have the capacity to exact punishment by exposing perpetrators and their crimes to 
public censure. However, despite ensuring a modicum of accountability and visibility, the practice of 
‘naming names’ is a matter of controversial application. Whilst the commissioners of the ‘United 
Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador’ argued that ‘not to name names would be to reinforce the 
very impunity to which parties instructed the commission to put an end’xxx, the Chilean ‘National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation’ declined to nominate perpetrators on the basis that it would 
be an abuse of due process due to the Commission’s lack of criminal jurisdiction.xxxi Despite 
constraints on the commissions’ ability to hold perpetrators accountable for their human rights 
violations, the reconciliatory benefits of providing a public forum for investigation and discussion is 
such that, according to Cynthia Mgewu, the mother of a member of the Guguletu Seven, ‘if it means 
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this perpetrator…becomes human again…so that I, so that all of us, get our humanity back, then I 
support it all.’xxxii 
 
After World War Two, thousands of denazification proceedings were commissioned in order to remove 
or prevent former Nazis from attaining positions of seniority in the post-war regime.xxxiii This process 
of lustration, since implemented by many former communist states such as the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia, supports the legitimacy of the new administration by removing human 
rights violators who are deemed a potential threat to the nation’s ongoing process of liberalisation. 
Despite serving as a effective method of deterrencexxxiv, the utilization of lustration as a means of 
collective punishment is contrary to the rule of law as those suspected of political links to the previous 
regime may have inadequate access to due process protections.xxxv Thus programmes of summary 
dismissal without demonstration of individual guilt may in fact destabilise the political system by 
creating substantial opposition to the new regime.xxxvi Therefore, a purging policy will only be effective 
if administered for a limited time periodxxxvii by a state-sanctioned, impartial body operating under the 
rule of law which guarantees the legal rights of those accused. xxxviii 
 
A key criticism of state-sponsored purges is based on the notion that ‘all [citizens] are responsible, each 
to a different degree, for keeping the totalitarian machine running.’ xxxix Due to the repressive nature of 
authoritarian and totalitarian governments, it is argued that many of those liable for lustration only 
obeyed the law, fulfilled the regime’s requirements of party membership and mouthed state ideologies 
in order to practice their profession or to avoid violent consequences.xl Therefore, a strict policy of 
state-sanctioned purges may hinder the process of reconciliation by denying skilled professionals the 
opportunity to contribute to the nation’s reconstruction.xli 
 
Based on the compensatory theory of justice, reparations serve as a tangible condemnation of past 
wrongdoings through the award of money to victims. This form of repayment aids renewal of both 
parties by offsetting the victims’ material losses and generating public acknowledgement of past 
violations and also legitimising the new regime by separating the perpetrators’ deeds from common 
morality.xlii Reparations also serve to establish new channels of communication between perpetrators 
and victims by replacing the search for universal models of reconciliation with local solutions agreed 
upon by all participants in the conflict.xliii However, whilst the voluntary payment of compensation may 
facilitate self-rehabilitation, such as the Federal Republic of Germany’s recompensatory scheme that 
commenced in 1952, external inducement may result in resentment, as demonstrated by the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles reparations treaty.xliv 
 
Despite the material benefits derived from reparations, rectifying wrongdoings by paying the victims 
‘blood money’ may be perceived as an inappropriate trivialising of their injuries, especially in 
situations of intangible loss such as the death of a loved one. xlv The use of compensation as a means of 
reconciliation also implies that, once paid for, the wrongs perpetrated have been fully rectified and 
need not be discussed again.  Thus, a reparations policy must be combined with an absolute and 
genuine apology in order to be effective.xlvi The use of apology serves to diminish the superficial nature 
of monetary repayments by further assigning responsibility to perpetrators of atrocities and publicly 
highlighting the victims’ suffering. The simultaneous employment of reparations and apology serves as 
a powerful method of social reintegration through the granting of both symbolic and tangible 
recompense. 
 
However, a significant shortcoming of recompensatory schemes is the reality that totalitarian, 
authoritarian and genocidal regimes commonly generate economically depressed states. In economic-
rationalist terms therefore, the reconciliation of an emerging nation is best achieved by using its’ 
limited funds to boost the economy, restructure the bureaucracy and invest in future-orientated 
schemesxlvii rather than by making small, token payments to a victimized minority.xlviii Therefore, 
although reparations may aid reconciliation between perpetrators of atrocities and their victims, it may 
not be entirely effective in promoting national growth as a whole. 
 
In conclusion, there is no process of reconciliation which is universally and invariably effective. 
Instead, when employing a form of transitional justice such as prosecution, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions, lustration, reparations and apology, it is vital to examine the unique characteristics of 
each emerging society. Only then can a nation come to terms with its past and begin a process of 
‘rehabilitation and…restoration of…human and civil dignity.’xlix 
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